Hollins University

Hollins Digital Commons
Ann B. Hopkins Papers

Manuscript Collections

10-1987

No. 87-11667 Brief Amicus Curiae of the Equal Employment
Advisory Council in the Support of the Petitioner
Supreme Court of the United States

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.hollins.edu/hopkins-papers
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons

No. 87-1167

IN THE

~uprrtttt <nnurt nf t4r 1!uitrh S,tatr.a
OCTOBER TERM,

1987

PRICE WATERHOUSE,

Petitioner,

v.
ANN

B. HOPKINS,

Respondent.
On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE OF THE
E,Q UAL EMPLOYMENT ADVISORY COUNCIL
IN THE SUPPORT OF THE PEri'ITIONER

ROBERT E. WILLIAMS
DOUGLAS S. McDOWELL
MCGUINESS & WILLIAMS

*

l

1015 Fifteenth Street, N.W.
Suite 1200
Washington, D.C. 20005
(202) 789-8600

Attorneys for the Amicus Curiae
Equal Employment
Advisory Council
* Counsel of Record
WILSON• EPES PRINTING CO.• INC. • 789-0096 • WASHINGTON. D.C. 20001

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF CONTENTS---------------------------------------------------

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES_______________________________________________

ii

INTEREST OF THE AMICUS CURIAE -----------------------

1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE-----------------------------------------

3

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT -----------------------------------------

8

ARGUMENT -------------------------···------------------------------------------TO PREVAIL IN A TITLE VII "MIXED MOTIVE" CASE, THE PLAINTIFF MUST DEMONSTRATE THAT THE DISCRIMINATOR Y MOTIVATION WAS THE DETERMINING ("BUT
FOR") FACTOR IN THE CHALLENGED EMPLOYMENT DECISION-------------------------------------------I. The Language Of Title VII Requires That To
Establish Illegal Discrimination And To Receive
Any Relief, The Plaintiff Must Prove The Employer's Action Was Taken "Because of" The
Plaintiff's Sex, Race Or Other Protected Characteristic -----------------------------------------------------------------II. Even Assuming That Discriminatory Motive
Can Be Shown, Once The Employer Provides A
Legitimate, Nondiscriminatory Reason For Its
Conduct, The Plaintiff Must Prove By A Preponderance Of The Evidence That The Misconduct Made a Difference In the Employer's Decision -----------------------------------------------------------------------III. Mt. Healthy And Transportation Management
Do Not Shift The Burden To The Employer In A
Title VII "Mixed Motive" Case. In Any Event
Those Decisions Only Impose A Burden To
Prove By A "Preponderance" Of The Evidence
Rather Than By "Clear and Convincing" Evidence -------------------------------------·-------------------------------------

10

CONCLUSION --------------------------------------------------------------------

10

10

13

18
22

ii
TABLE OF AUTHOR ITIES

Cases
Bibbs v. Block, 778 F.2d 1318 (8th Cir. 1985) ........
Blalock v. Metals Trades, Inc., 775 F.2d 703 (6th

Page
12

Cir. 1985) ................................................ ................ 11, 12

Ii

Board of Trustees of Keene State College v.
Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24 (1978) ............................... 12, 20
3
Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982) ................
16
........
1979)
Cir.
(1st
663
F.2d
Fisher v . Flynn, 598
Furnco Construction Corporation v. Waters, 438
U.S. 567 (1978) .................................................. 3, 8, 12, 13

Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated School Dis21
trict, 439 U.S. 410 (1979 ) .....................................
16
..
(1984)
69
Hishon v. King & Spaulding, 467 U.S.
International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United
States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977) ................................... 3, 13
La Montagne v. American Convenience Products,
Inc., 750 F.2d 1405 (7th Cir. 1984) ................ ..... 9, 16
Lucy v. Manville Sales Corporation, 674 F. Supp.
1426 (D. Colo. 1987) .............................................

Marek v. Chesney, 473 U.S. 1 (1985) .....................
McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transpor tation Company, 427 U.S. 273 (1976) .....................................
McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792

16
21

12

(1973) ······································································ 12, 14

McQuillen v. Wisconsin Educatio n Association
Council, 830 F.2d 659 (7th Cir. 1987) .............10, 11, 15
Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977) .............. 9, 18, 20, 21
National Labor Relations Board v. Transpor tation
Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393 (1983) ..... 9, 18, 19, 21
Texas Departm ent of Commun ity Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981) ............... 3, 7, 9, 12, 14, 15, 19
Toney v. Block, 705 F.2d 1364 (D.C. Cir. 1983) .... 7, 8
United States Postal Service Board of Governors
v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711 (1983) ........... 3, 9, 14, 15, 19, 21
United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193
(1979) ······································································

14

1842 (1986) .............................................................

18

Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 106 S.Ct.
I

iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITI ES-Continue d

Statutes
Page
Age Discriminatio n in Employment Act (ADEA)
29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. ------------------------ --------------------2
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as
amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. ·---------------------2
Section 703 (a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 ___ _______________ _ 10, 11
Section 706 (g), 42 U.S_C, ·§ 2000e-5 __ _________ ____ __ __
11
Miscellaneous
McCormick's Handbook of the Law of Evidence,
Second Ed., West Publishing Co., 1972 ________ ____ __

21

IN THE

~uprrmr Olnurt nf tl]r l!tuitrh ~tutr.a
OCTOBER TERM,

1987

;.

No. 87-1167

PRICE WATERH OUSE,

Petitioner,

v.
ANN

B. HOPKINS ,

Respondent.
On Writ of Certiorar i to the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE OF THE
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT' ADVISORY COUNCIL
IN THE SUPPORT OF THE PETITIO NER

The Equal Employment Advisory Council
("EEAC ") respectfully submits this brief amicus
curiae in support of the Petition er. The written consents of all parties have been filed with the Clerk of
this Court.
INTERE ST OF THE AMICUS CURIAE

EEAC is a nationw ide association of employers
and trade associations organized in 1976 to promote
sound approaches to the elimination of discrimi natory
employment practices. Its membership comprises a
broad segment of the business community. Its gov-

2

erning body is a Board of Directo rs composed of experts and specialists in equal employment opportunity. Their combined experience gives the Council an
unmatched depth of knowledge of the practic al as
well as the legal aspects of equal employment opportunity progra ms and requirements. The members of
EEAC are firmly committed to the principles of nondiscrim ination and equal employment opportu nity.
All of EEAC 's members, and the constit uents of
its trade association members, are employers subject
to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as
amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and the Age Discrimina tion in Employment Act (ADEA ), 29 U.S.C.
§ 621 et seq., as well as other equal employment statutes and regulations. As employers, and as potenti al
respondents to charges of discrim ination pursua nt to
Title VII and the ADEA , EEAC' s members have a
strong interes t in the issues presented here.
In this case, the district court found that there
were legitimate, nondis crimina tory and nonpre textual
reasons for the employment decision, and also that
there was no showing by the plaintif f that asserte dly
sexually stereotypical statem ents played a causal role
in the plaintif f's failure to be made a partner . The
court of appeals, however, shifted the burden to the
employer to prove by "clear and convincing" evidence
that the unlawf ul factor was not the determ inative
one. This burden of proof is out of step with previous decisions of this Court holding that the burden
of proof remain s at all times with the plaintif f in a
dispara te treatm ent case. In addition, the use of the
"clear and convincing" standa rd below was erroneous and contrar y to previous decisions of this Court
using the "prepo nderan ce of the evidence" standar d.

3
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Affirmance of the standa rds applied below would
impro perly shift the burden in Title VII, ADEA and
other employment-related actions .
Because of its intere st in the application of the
nation 's civil rights laws, EEAC has filed over 230
briefs as amicus curiae in cases before the United
States Supreme Court, the United States Circui t
Courts of Appeals and variou s state suprem e courts.
As part of this amicus activity, EEAC has partic ipated in several cases involving the burden of proof
in discrim ination cases, including Texas Department
of Community Affair s v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248
(1981 ); Furnco Construction Co. v. Waters, 438
U.S. 567 (1978 ); United States Postal Service Board
of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711 (1983 ); Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982) and International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States,
431 U.S. 324 ( 1977) .
STATE MENT OF THE CASE

The plainti ff in this case was a senior manag er who
was informed that she would not be selected as a
partne r by Price Waterhouse. The decision not to
select plainti ff as a partne r came at the end of a
comprehensive process. Price Water house is one of
the "big eight" accounting firms. When the trial
began in this case, it had 662 partne rs worki ng in 90
offices around the country. (Pet. App. 3a) .1 Potential partne rs are nominated by a local office. The
names and accompanying perfor mance apprai sals of
all nominees are circulated to all partne rs, who are
invited to comment on candidates. (Pet. App. 5a).
1
"Pet. App." referen ces are to the append ix to the petition
for certior ari.
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Long or short form evalua tions are filled out, depending on the degree of knowledge of the candidate. All
nominees are ranked agains t other recent partne rship candid ates in 48 categories. (Pet. App. 41a).
Recommendations for partne rship are made to the
Policy Board by its Admissions Committee. The
Board then votes on which candid ates are to be included on the partnership ballot. A partne rship- wide
election then is held. Those not placed on the ballot
are informed of the Board 's reasons for rejecti ng or
postponing their candidacies. ( Pet. App. 5a).
The distric t court below found that:
Because the plainti ff had considerable problems
dealing with staff and peers, the Court canno t
say that she would have been elected to partne rship if the Policy Board 's decision had not been
tainte d by sexually biased evaluations. Even
suppo rters of the plainti ff viewed her style as
somewhat offensive and detrim ental to her effectiveness as a manag er.
(Pet. App. 59a). One fourth of the thirty- two partners who evalua ted the plainti ff opposed her admission. (Pet. App. 6a) . Three others recommended
that she be held for reconsideration; and eight said
they had insufficient inform ation to form an opinion.
(Id.).
The distric t court found that " [ m] any of the comments from evalua ting partne rs centered on Hopki ns'
appar ent difficulties with staff, and both suppo rters
and opponents of her candidacy charac terized her as
sometimes overly aggres sive, unduly harsh, impat ient
with staff and very deman ding." (Id.) . Indeed,
plainti ff had been counseled about these shortcom-
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ings and indicated "that she agreed with many of
these criticis ms." ( Pet. App. 46a) .
"

'

On the other hand, the district court stated that
Hopkins was "qualified for partner ship consideration", as she was "exceptionally successful in garnering business for the firm." (Pet. App. 4a). In
addition, there were a numbe r of negative comments
that the courts below found were sex-related. For example, stateme nts were made sugges ting she needed a
course in "charm school", that she may "have overcompensated for being a woman", or that she used
profani ty. (Pet. App. 6a). Other examples of allegedly discrim inatory statem ents are set out in the
decisions below.
In evaluat ing plaintif f's argume nts that the decision to deny her partner ship was discrim inatory , the
district court held: "that the complaints about the
plaintif f's interpe rsonal skills were not fabrica ted as
a pretext for discrm ination " (Pet. App. 46a-48 a);
and that "Price Waterh ouse had legitimate, nondiscrimin atory reasons for disting uishing between the
plaintif f and the male partne rs with whom she compares herself " ( Pet. App. at 48a). Nevertheless, the
district court found that sex-related comments were
made about plaintiff, relying on the testimo ny of an
"exper t" in stereot yping who "did not purpor t to be
able to determine whethe r or not any particular reaction was determined by the operation of sex stereotypes." (Pet. App. 53a) ( emphasis added) .
The Court then found :
[WJ hile stereot yping played an undefined role in
blocking plaintif f's admission to the partner ship
in this instance, it was unconscious on the part of
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the partner s who submit ted comments. The
comments of the individual partners and the expert evidence of Dr. Fiske do not prove an intentional discriminatory motive or purpose.
( Pet. App. 54a) ( emphasis added) .
But the district court also stated that although this
stereot yping may have been unconscious, Price Waterhouse mainta ined a system that gave weight to such
criticism. Thus, the court held that the plaintif f was
the victim of "omissive and subtle" discrimination.
( Pet. A pp. 56a). Stating that there was a "mixtu re
of legitim ate and discrim inatory considerations," the
court held that the plaintif f was entitled to relief
"unless the employer has demon strated by clear and
convincing evidence that the decision would have been
the same absent discrim ination ." Pet. App. 59a.
The "clear and convincing" burden placed on the
employer by the district court was affirmed by the
court of appeals. The court of appeals noted that
the "courts have struggl ed to resolve the difficult
questions of causati on that arise in mixed-motive
2
cases such as this." ( Pet. App. 22a) . It then reviewed the confusion in the court of appeals decisions.
(Pet. App. 20a-24 a). 3 It held that when the plaintif f
In its brief to this Court, Price Waterho use properly disputes the characte rization s of the courts below that this is a
"mixed motive" case, as did Judge William s' dissent, discusse d
below. The Amicus strongly concurs with those argumen ts.
3
Indeed, as the petition for a writ of certiora ri in this case
shows, "the courts of appeals have devised no fewer than five
inconsis tent ways to resolve cases in which it is argued that
the defenda nt acted on the basis of both a lawful and an
unlawfu l motive." Cert. Pet. 13.
12
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has shown that impermissible bias was a part of the
employment decision:
"We chose ... to place the !burden upon the employer to show, by 'clear and convincing evidence,'
that the unlawful factor was not the determina tive one."
Pet. App. 23a, citing Toney v. Block, 705 F.2d 1364,
1366 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (emphasis in original). It is
this ruling that is addressed by this brief.
In dissent, Judge Williams criticized the majority' s
reliance on assertedly stereotypical language in order
to find a violation, stating that this "evidence of sexual stereotypi ng is carefully culled from a mass of
critical comments on the plaintiff's abrasiven ess with
no sex link whatever. " Pet. App. 29a. The dissent
stated that these negative comments about plaintiff's
partnersh ip qualifications were well founded in fact,
represente d standards applied to men and women
alike, and were the true basis of the firm's decision.
Pet. App. at 29a-30a. Applying the standards of
Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine,
450 U.S. 248 (1981), Judge Williams criticized the
majority for improperly putting upon the defendant
the burden of proving that its reasons were not pretextual. Pet. App. 30a.

l

I

Further, in vivid contrast to the majority' s reliance
upon an "expert" in sex stereotypi ng who was not
familiar with the specific facts of this case, Judge
Williams examined in detail the effect this alleged
stereotypi ng played in the partnersh ip decision and
determine d that the record did not support the majority's conclusions. Pet. App. 31a-38a.

' II

I
8
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Judge Williams also criticized the majority for
calling this a "mixed motive" case as" 'discrimination
has not been specifically attributed to the employment
decision of which the plaintiff complains'", Pet. App.
38a, citing Toney v. Block, 705 F.2d 1364, 1366
(D.C. Cir. 1983). Since there was not enough evidence to support a verdict for the plaintiff "under
any established approach to Title VII liability,"
Judge Williams would not have found a violation.
Pet. App. 38a-39a.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The decisions below improperly shifted the burden
to the employer to prove by "clear and convincing"
evidence that the unlawful factor was not the determinative factor in plaintiff's failure to attain partnership. Under Title VII's language, the plaintiff
must prove that she was adversely affected "because
of" her sex-a finding which the district court specifically found could not be made in this case. As the
courts have recognized, employment decisions are
complex, and an undeserving plaintiff should not prevail merely because the record may reveal an instance
of illegal motivation which the plaintiff cannot prove
had a causal connection to the denial of a job opportunity.
Thus, this Court has developed a "sensible, orderly" method of allocating the burden of proof.
Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567,
577 (1978). Even if the plaintiff can demonstrate
that an illegal motive may he present, the employer
can rebut this evidence with evidence that its decision
was based upon legitimate considerations. At this
point, the initial prima f acie presumption "drops

,.I
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.

from the case," the district court is to examine all the
facts developed at trial, and the "plaintiff retains the
burden of ... persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer ... "
U.S. Postal Service Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460
U.S. 711, 716 (1983) (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at
248) ( emphasis added) .
There are sound, practical reasons for allocating
the proof in this manner. Often it can be shown that
the person who made a discriminatory statement was
not involved to a sufficient degree in the employment
decision. La Montagne v. American Convenience
Products, Inc., 750 F.2d 1405, 1412-13 (7th Cir.
1984). In other cases, the individual will lack the
qualifications, or cannot show that there was an
opening available for the position sought. Other
times, as in the instant case, the employer's statements cannot be shown to be pretextual, or the plaintiff cannot establish a causal connection between the
alleged discrimination and the employer's conduct.
This Court's decisions in Mt. Healthy City School
District v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977), and
National Labor Relations Board v. Transportation
Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393 (1983) do not require a different result. Neither was a Title VII case
nor involved a statutory scheme which bars relief
unless the plaintiff can show that a employment benefit was denied "because of" discrimination. Also,
Transportation Management was based upon the fact
that the NLRB viewed the employer's burden as establishing an "affirmative defense" ( 462 U.S. at 40203), a standard never used in allocating Title VII's
evidentiary burdens. Finally, in any event, inasmuch
as both Mt. Healthy and Transportation Manage-
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ment used the "preponderance of the evidence" standard, the unexplained use of the "clear and convincing" standard below cannot stand.
ARGUMENT
TO PREVAIL IN A TITLE VII "MIXEH MOTIVE"
CASE', THE PLAINTIFF MUST DEMONSTRATE
THAT THE DISCRIMINATORY MOTIVATION WAS
THE DETERMINING ("BUT FOR") FACTOR IN THE
CHALLENGED EMPLOYMENT DECISION.
I. The Language Of Title VII Requires That To Establish
Illegal Discrimination And To Receive Any Relief, The
Plaintiff Must Prove The Employer's Action Was
Taken "Because Of" The Plaintiff's Sex, Race Or Other
Protected Characteristic.

By placing the burden on the employer to prove
by "clear and convincing" evidence that the unlawful
factor was not the determinativ e factor in an employment decision, the courts below improperly shifted
the Title VII burden of proof onto the employer and
ignored established precedent rejecting the clear and
convincing standard.
In order to prevail in a Title VII case, the plaintiff must prove that the employment decision was
caused by illegal discrimination. Section 703 (a) of
Title VII prohibits discriminati on against an individual "because of" that person's race, color, religion,
sex or national origin.4 See McQuillen v. Wisconsin
The full text of Section 703 (a), 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000-e-2 (a)
( 1982) states as follows :
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
4
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Education Association Council, 830 F.2d 659, 664
(7th Cir. 1987) . Additionally, proof of causa tion is
requir ed by Title VII's remedial provision. Section
706 (g), 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5 (g), forbid s the court s
from giving relief (such as hiring , reinst ateme nt,
promotion, or back pay), if that indivi dual was refused employment, advancement or was suspended
or discharged "for any reason other than discrimination."
Obviously, in some cases the evidence of an employer's discri minat ory animu s may be so stron g as
to "effectively preclude an employer from contending
that the same decision would have been made regar dless of the employer's motivation." See Bl,alock v.
Metals Trades, Inc., 775 F.2d 703, 712 (6th Cir.
1985) . In many instances, like the instan t case, however, there may be many reasons for an employment
decision. Thus,
employment decisions are often complex, and,
where dozens of factor s are involved in evaluation of an employee, the fact that one such factor is impermissible does not necessarily preclude the contention that the adverse employment action would have been taken regar dless of
the impermissible factor.

'

privile ges of employment, becaus e of such individ ual's
race, color, religion, sex, or nation al origin ; or
(2) to limit, segreg ate, or classif y his employees or
applic ants for emplo yment in any way which would
depriv e or tend to depriv e any individ ual of emplo yment
opport unities or otherw ise advers ely affect his status as
an employee, becaus e of such individ ual's race, color, religion, sex, or nation al origin.
( Empha sis added. )
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II. Even Assuming T'hat Discriminatory Motive Can Be
Shown, Once The Employer Provides A Legitimate
Nondiscriminatory Reason For Its Conduc4 The
Plaintif f Must Prove By A Preponderance Of The Evidence That The Misconduct Made A Difference In The
Employer's Decision.
),

As shown, a Title VII plaintif f may establish a
prima facie case of discrim ination either by direct
evidence, or by the McDonnell Douglas constru ct permitting an inference of intentio nal discrim ination .
The central focus of the inquiry is always whethe r
"[t]he employer simply [is treatin g] some people
less favorab ly than others because of their race, color,
religion, sex, or nationa l origin. '" Teamsters v.
United States, 431 U.S. at 335 n.15 ( emphasis
added) . If the employer's actions remain unexplained,
the presum ption arises that they are "more likely
than not based on the consideration of impermissible
factors .'' Furnco, 438 U.S. at 577.
But rather than adopt hard-an d-fast, inflexible
requirements, the court has require d a realisti c application of this legal formula. As explained in
Furnco:
[W]e know from our experience that more
often than not people do not act in a totally arbitrary manner, withou t any underlying reasons,
especially in a business setting. Thus, when all
legitim ate reasons for rejectin g an applica nt
have been elimina ted as possible reasons for the
employer's actions, it is more likely than not the
employer, who we general ly assume acts only
with some [empha sis in origina l] reason, based
his decision on an impermissible consideration,
such as race.
438 U.S. at 577 (emphasis added) }5
" As the Court has noted, "[Title Vil] was not intended to
'diminis h tradition al manage ment preroga tives.' " Burdine,
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After the district court has tried the case and has
all the evidence before it, this Court has cautione d
against becoming bogged down in a mechanistic application of the McDonnell Douglas standard s and
"unnece ssarily evad[in g] the ultimate question of
discrimination, vel non." See U.S. Postal Service Bd.
of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 714 (1983).
Once the employer introduces evidence that it acted
for "a" legitimate, nondisc riminato ry reason (Aikens, 460 U.S. at 714), "'the factual inquiry proceeds
to a new level of specific ity.'" Id., at 715, citing Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255. Aikens showed that, despite
his qualifications, whites were promoted above him.
In addition : "He introduced testimon y that the person responsible for the promotion decisions at issue
ha,d made numerous derogatory comments about
blacks in general and Aikens in particular." 460 U.S.
at 714 n. 2 (emphasis added). Thus, even in the face
of apparen tly direct evidence of anti-blac k animus,
this Court stated that the initial prima facie presumption of discrimi nation "drops from the case",
460 U.S. at 715.
Thus, with a full record before it, the district court
should look at "all the evidence". 460 U.S. at 715.
As in "other civil litigatio n," the court should decide
"dispute d" questions of fact. 460 U.S. at 715-16.
"The plaintiff retains the burden of persuasi on
. . . [HJ e may succeed in this either directly by
persuad ing the court that a discrimi natory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer's proffered
explanation is unworth y of credence."
450 U.S. at 259 (quoting McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at
207). See also, United Steelwork ers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193,
206 (1979).
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460 U.S. at 716, citing Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256. Accordingly, it is clear that even where direct proof of
discriminatory intent has been shown, when the employer introduces evidence showing a legitimate reason for its conduct, the plaintiff cannot prevail absent
a showing that it was the discriminatory reason that
"more likely motivated the employer." 6 The courts
below thus were patently in error by placing the burden on the employer to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that the unlawful factor was not the
determinative one.
Moreover, there are important, practical reasons
why a plaintiff who cannot meet this burden of proving causation should not be able to prevail merely by
showing that someone in a supervisory capacity "harbored some discriminatory motivation." McQuillen
v. Wisconsin Education Association Council, 830
F.2d 659, 664 (7th Cir. 1987). The employee also
"must establish that the discriminatory motivation
was a determining factor in the challenged employment decision in that the employee would have received the job absent the discriminatory motivation."
Id.
This Court has rejected arguments that this places an impermissible burden on the plaintiff. As explained in Burdine,
the employer's reasons must be "clear and reasonably specific."
450 U.S. at 258. In addition, "the liberal discovery rules
applicable to any civil suit in federal court are supplemented
in a Title VII suit by the plaintiff's access to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's investigatory files concerning her complaint." Id. at 258. Indeed, in the district
court below, Judge Gesell stated : "In the course of this trial,
Price Waterhouse has been very forthcoming in providing
information on its partnership se[le]ction process." Pet.
App. 49a.
6

16

For example, the courts have recognized that while
the record in a particular case may establish that
a statement was improperly race- or sex-based, it
often can be shown that the person who made the
statement was not involved to a sufficient degree in
the decision at issue. See La Montagne v. American
Convenience Products, Inc., 750 F.2d 1405, 1412-13
(7th Cir. 1984); Fisher v. Flynn, 598 F.2d 663, 665
(1st Cir. 1979); and Lucy v. Manville Sales Corp.,
67 4 F. Supp. 1426 (D. Colo. 1987). Under these
cases, the employee's failure to establish a "causal
connection" between the alleged discriminatory conduct and the employer's action ultimately was sufficient to defeat the discrimination claim also. In addition, there often will be overriding reasons that a
person will not be given an employment opportunity,
such as lack of qualifications, lack of openings, or
other reason showing the individual would not have
been hired.
This case provides an apt example. Here, an accounting firm of immense size had the difficult task of
identifying and choosing who will be selected for
partnership. Evaluations of a large number of candidates are done by a large number of existing partners. While isolated improper statements allegedly
were made, those statements should not be determinative where there are overriding, legitimate reasons
for not making the individual a firm partner.
Partnership, of course, is much more than an ordinary employment relationship. Numerous subjective concerns necessarily are involved, such as professional standing, outside activities, adequacy of
billings, and contributions to the success and reputation of the firm. Cf. Hishon v. King &: Spaulding,
467 U.S. 69, 79-81, and n.3 (1984) (Powell, J., con-
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curring). One of the most important factors is the
ability to get along with other partners and members
of the staff-the very concerns upon which Price
Waterhouse determined not to make the plaintiff a
partner.
Here, the district court held that it could not say
that she would have been selected for partnership if
the Policy Board's decision had not been tainted by
sexually biased evaluations. Pet. A pp. 59a. It also
held that "[t]he comments of the individual partners
and the expert evidence by Dr. Fiske do not prove
an intentionally discriminatory motive or purpose."
Pet. App. 54a. Judge Gesell further ruled that "the
complaints about the plaintiff's interpersonal skills
were not fabricated as a pretext for discrimination."
Pet. App. 46a. Given those holdings, it was clear that
the employer had met its burden of rebutting the
plaintiff's prima facie case. Since the plaintiff failed
to prove that she would have been chosen "but for"
the alleged discriminatory conduct, the suit should
have been dismissed. 7
7

The district court's reliance on so-called expert testimony
of sex stereotyping is troublesome, inasmuch as Judge Gesell
found that "Dr. Fiske did not purport to be able to determine
whether or not any particular reaction was determined by the
operation of sex stereotypes. However, she did identify comments that she believed were influenced by sex stereotypes."
Pet. App. 53a. (Emphasis added). The determination of
whether race or sex played a part in a particular employment
decision would seem to be the ultimate issue for the district
court, and an inappropriate issue on which to allow a purported "expert" to express a belief, particularly in view of
Dr. Fiske's failure to examine any of Price Waterhouse's
partners or their particular reactions to Ms. Hopkins.
Equally disturbing is the district court's apparent deference
to technical research (Pet. App. 52a-53a and n.10). The dis-
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III. Mt. Healthy And Transportation Management Do Not
Shift The Burden To The Employer In A Title VII
''Mixed Motive" Case. In Any Event Those Decisions
Only Impose A Burden To Prove By A "Preponderance" Of The Evidence Rather Than By "Clear And
Convincing" Evidence.

The plaintiff's opposition to the writ of certiorari
erroneously states that "the district court then followed settled precedent and inquired whether Price
Waterhouse had proved that Hopkins would have
been rejected even in a bias-free setting. Mt. Healthy
City School Dist. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977);
National Labor Relations Board v. Transportation
Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 403 (1983)." Op.
cert. at 3. The plaintiff is wrong for at least three
reasons. First, the district court did not even mention those decisions. Second, those decisions are not
applicable to Title VII cases. Third, both courts below improperly imposed a "clear and convincing"
standard in this civil litigation-a burden that is
clearly at odds with the "preponderance" standard
previously used by this Court in the Mt. Healthy line
of cases.
trict court came dangerously close to taking judicial notice of
research opinion which was not subject to deposition, cross
examination and the other rigours of trial. Inasmuch as
"societal discrimination" is not sufficient for proof under Title
VII (See generally, Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education,
106 S.Ct. 1842, 1847-49 (1986) (Opinion of Powell, J.)), use
of generalized research opinion seems even more inappropriate in a case where there has been such extensive discovery
in the district court as to the specific employment decisions
of a particular employer. A much more appropriate and valid
analysis of the evidence of this particular case was undertaken by Judge Williams in his dissenting opinion below. Pet.
App. 28a-39a.
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Neither Mt. Healthy (a constitu tional case) nor
Transportation Management ( a Nationa l Labor Relations Act case) involved statutor y languag e such
as found in Title VII which imposes upon the plaintiff the burden of proving that the discrimi nation
was "because of" the employer's discrimination. Indeed, neither decision even discussed the languag e of
Title VII upon which the Title VII statutor y burden
of proof scheme is based.
As previously shown, this Court's Title VII cases,
for good reason, have never moved the burden of
proof to the employer. Instead, under Title VII, even
if the plaintiff can establish some direct evidence of
discrimi natory motive, once the employer articula tes
a legitima te nondisc riminato ry reason, the initial
prima facie presump tion "drops from the case," 460
U.S. at 715 ( quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255, n.10)
and the plaintiff retains the burden of persuasi on
that "a discrimi natory motive more likely motivated
the employer." Aikens, 460 U.S. at 716 ( quoting
Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256) (emphasis added). This
statutor y difference by itself is sufficient to distinguish the Mt. Healthy line of cases.
In addition , Transportation Management was
grounde d in large part upon the NLRB's construction of the Nationa l Labor Relations Act that the
employer would have· an "affirma tive defense" ( 462
U.S. at 402-03) of proving by a prepond erance of the
evidence that it would have reached the same decision
even if it had not been motivated by an imprope r
motivation. This Court has never construed the employer's Title VII burden as involving an "affirmative defense". Thus Transportation Management is
inapplicable to Title VIL Indeed, it was to correct a

20

similar error that this Court issued its per curiam
decision in Board of Trustees of Keene St. College v.
Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24 (1978) and made clear that
the employer cannot be required to prove the absence of discriminato ry motive.
Further, Transportation Management held that the
Court's Title VII Burdine decision was "inapposite" ,
noting both that the plaintiff in Burdine bore the
"ultimate burden" of persuading the trier of fact
that the defendant committed discrimination, and
that no illegal motivation was involved in Burdine.
As shown above, the Court's Aikens decision clarified
that the plaintiff's Title VII burden is to prove that
the discriminato ry motive "more likely" motivated
the employer.
What is relevant from Mt. Healthy is the Court's
concern that an employee who engaged in protected
constitution al conduct should not be reinstated if there
were other legitimate reasons for not doing so, particularly in light of the "significant ," "long-term
consequences" of the tenure decision at issue in that
case. 429 U.S. at 286. The Court reasoned in lift.
Healthy that: "[t]he constitution al principle at
stake is sufficiently vindicated if such an employee is
placed in no worse a position than if he had not engaged in the conduct." 429 U.S. at 285-86. As the
Court stated in language directly applicable to the
plaintiff here:
that same candidate ought not to be able, by engaging in such [protected] conduct, to prevent
his employer from assessing his performance
record and reaching a decision not to rehire on
the basis of that record. . . .
429 U.S. at 286.
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Finally, in the event that the Court should find
that its Mt. Healthy line of cases should be applied
to Title VII, it then should reject the "clear and convincing" standard applied by the courts below.
Neither court offered any statutory or decisional authority for their unusual holdings, apparently relying on mere ipse dixit to establish the employer's ultimate burden of proof.
This Court consistently has held that a defendant
may prevail if it can show "by a preponderance of
the evidence that it would have reached the same
decision as to respondent's reemployment even in the
absence of the protected conduct." Mt. Healthy, 429
U.S. at 287 (Emphasis added). The preponderance
standard also was used in Transportation Management (462 U.S. at 402), and Givhan v. Western Line
Consolidated School District, 439 U.S. 410, 416
(1979).
It is hornbook law that the "preponderance of the
evidence" standard is the standard to be used "on
the general run of issues in civil cases . . . . " McCormick's Handbook of the Law of Evidence, Second
Ed., West Publishing Co., 1972, at p. 793. The "clear
and convincing" standard is used only in "certain
exceptional controversies" not applicable here. Id., at
793, 796-98. And as the Court stated in Aikens,
questions of fact in Title VII cases are to be decided
"just as district courts decide disputed questions of
fact in other civil litigation." 460 U.S. at 715-16. 8
Accordingly, whichever party bears the ultimate burden in this case, that burden may be met by satisfying the "preponderance of the evidence" standard.
Accord, Marek v. Chesney, 473 U.S. 1, 10 (1985) (No
evidence "that civil rights claims were to be on any different
footing from other civil claims ...").
8
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CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, the decision below should
be reversed.
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